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"Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree" 
Accountants' Legal Liability— 
A Historical Perspective 
Paul J. Ostling* 
Arthur Young & Co. 
I. Introduction 
It is difficult  these days to read a week's worth of  newspaper financial 
sections and business magazines without finding  an article, sometimes lurid, 
discussing the role and liabilities of  the public auditor. Those within the 
profession  often  view this attention as an undeserved, new development. 
Certainly the frequency,  scope, and magnitude of  civil suits against auditors 
have grown. There has, however, always been a close connection between the 
legal liabilities imposed upon auditors and the standards adopted by the 
profession—as  well as its perceived scope and responsibilities of  practice. 
This paper describes some present and recent legal challenges facing  the 
profession,  their historical perspective, and predictions as to possible future 
developments. Taken in perspective, current attacks on the profession  may be 
no more than a maturation and reevaluation of  the auditor's standards and role. 
As the investor community becomes more sophisticated in its appreciation of 
the limitations in the auditor's role pursuant to generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS), and better understands the "gray areas" where generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) permit more than one treatment of 
certain financial  transactions, a credibility gap looms. To reduce the gap, the 
courts and legislators are attempting to regulate the profession  and impose 
more "watchdog" responsibilities. Because of  the gap, insurance companies 
and bright young graduates, fearful,  respectively, of  large legal judgments and 
less rewarding career opportunities may avoid the accounting profession. 
Counter-productive activities of  the professionals  themselves and their 
representative associations may be complicating this trend. Nearly predatory 
competition drives the price of  audit services downward at the very same time 
that the attendant risks are skyrocketing. Legislative "overseers" lambast the 
profession,  often  inaccurately and unjustifiably,  but the associations often  seem 
timid by comparison in their response. Public auditors must act quickly and 
affirmatively  to resolve these conflicts  in order to assure the future  growth and 
profitability  of  the profession. 
* The views expressed herein are those of  the author individually. 
II. Development of  Standards and Liabilities 
It is now settled that the role and responsibilities of  the public auditor 
include the supply of  accurate financial  information  to facilitate  the function  of 
the free  markets, including the securities markets. This was not always 
accepted by the profession  as such. Indeed, our predecessors in practice 
initially viewed their audience as including only their direct, paying clients. 
Auditors vociferously  resisted the expansion of  their role and responsibilities, 
and changes were frequently  the result of  litigation losses and/or government 
intervention. 
A. Our United  Kingdom  Roots 
While there are reports of  "auditors" having counting responsibilities 
during biblical times, the analysis of  the evolution of  accountants' legal liabilities 
must commence in the United Kingdom. It comes as no great surprise to even 
the less scholarly students of  the profession  that the modern auditing 
profession  as we know it evolved in England and Scotland. 
— Laws permitting the formation  of  corporate entities (whose ownership was 
represented by and transferable  through stock) and the concept of  "limited 
liability" (that a shareholder is liable to the extent of  his capital invested in 
purchasing stock, but is not "personally liable") were passed there during the 
1840's and 1850's. The Joint Stock Companies Act of  18441 required that a 
"full  and fair''  balance sheet be sent to shareholders before  their meetings and 
filed  with the Registrar of  Companies. Auditors (who were to be non-office-
holding stock-holders) were required to be appointed to report on the balance 
sheet. There were no meaningful  legal requirements or standards as to the 
form  or content of  the balance sheets or the manner of  the conduct of  the 
auditors' reviews. There were no enforcement  provisions relating to the 
content or the filing  of  the balance sheet with the Registrar of  Companies. The 
1844 Act should not be thought of  as anything approaching our own federal  or 
state securities laws. 
Because the balance sheets were standardless and the "audits" were a 
perfunctory  checking of  support for  disbursements there was little faith  by 
third parties in either the fullness  or fairness  of  the balance sheets.2 The 
balance sheet requirement was dropped in 1856,3 and the matter of  accounting 
and auditing was left  up to the corporations themselves. It was not until 1900 
that all registrants under the Companies Act were again required to have 
annual audits conducted. In 1907, they were again required to file  their balance 
sheets.4 
In the fifty-year  interim, however, certain industry-specific  requirements 
were enacted. During the late 1860's railroad companies were required to 
publish their accounts; during the 1870's banks were required to audit their 
accounts and gas companies to publish theirs; and in the early 1880's electrical 
companies were to publish their accounts. These industries were regarded as 
special because of  the public trust in their operations, or the speculative nature 
of  their early operations. In the meantime, the accounting profession  was 
beginning to organize and establish standards. In Scotland, the Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh was granted a royal charter in 1854. In England, a 
charter was granted to The Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and 
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Wales in 1880. Two other associations were formed  in Scotland, and in England 
the Society of  Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was formed  in 1885. In 
both Scotland and England these groups agreed upon uniform  examinations for 
new members (designated chartered accountant or C.A.) as well as appren-
ticeship programs.5 
The British audit during the 1880's evolved as having the primary goal of 
uncovering fraud.  Detailed bookkeeping-type examinations reviewed the num-
bers in the books of  account. Courses in study evolved in auditing, and a 
textbook was prepared. Customs developed for  the preparation of  the auditors' 
"certification".  The Scots and English auditors had acquired some status and 
had established some commonly accepted auditing and accounting "standards" 
by 1900, when all registered companies were required to have audits 
conducted. For example, the use of  the term "certificate"  to describe the 
report, and the representation that financial  statements "present fairly"  were 
English customs. This is not to say, however, that auditors' "legal liabilities" 
had been yet fully  examined. 
For the most part the manner of  report and the procedures applied were 
determined by the corporation's articles of  incorporation and the engagement 
contract between the auditor and the client. In most cases the company's 
articles required that the balance sheet be "full  and fair"  and prepared to 
display the "true and correct" picture of  the company's "state of  affairs." 
This requirement was based upon the model articles of  incorporation appended 
to the 1856 Companies Act.6 The earliest reported losing cases involving 
auditors arose in England prior to 1900, and focused  upon whether the 
auditor's certificate  had adequately communicated the "state of  affairs"  of  the 
company.7 
In the case of  Leeds  Estate,  the auditor's certificate  for  seven years, 1874 
through 1880, said: 
I certify  that I have examined the above accounts and find  them to be a 
true copy of  those [shown] in the books of  the company. 
While escaping damages because that statute of  limitations had run, the 
auditor was found  guilty of  negligence to its client for  failing  to actually go 
behind the numbers presented by management to ascertain their accuracy. 
In In  re London  the auditor's 1892 certificate  said: 
We have examined the . . . balance-sheet and compared it with the 
books of  the company; and we certify  that it is a correct summary of  the 
accounts therein recorded. The value of  the assets as [shown] on the 
balance-sheet is dependent upon their realization. 
Again the auditor was found  liable for  negligence in breaching its duty to its 
clients—the shareholders—because the Court felt  the words "subject to 
realization" was not a qualification  which adequately communicated the com-
pany's true state of  affairs. 
Thus, by 1900, some rudimentary legal reporting requirements had been 
imposed upon their clients, and the court had just begun to impose a legal duty 
3 
upon auditors to carry out an audit in accordance with their engagement 
contracts. The duty was a narrow one by today's standards, but the auditors 
gave those clients some level of  comfort  with regard to detecting fraud  which 
was on the clients' books. To be sure, the primary purposes and benefits  from 
the audit were to assist the client's management in monitoring its financial 
matters, ward off  defalcations,  and secure financial  support from  bankers. 
B. Migration  to America 
In 1776, America was essentially an agrarian society. While the revolution 
removed the yoke of  British governmental rule, the financial  connections which 
had already been formed  by British financiers  provided much of  the capital for 
the American industrial revolution. American states passed laws permitting the 
formation  of  corporations. The industrial revolution, corporate growth, and 
British investment all led to the birth of  the accounting profession  in America— 
but as a child of  the United Kingdom practice. 
Individuals, such as Arthur Young, came to America in growing numbers 
during the 1880's and 1890's to look after  the interests of  English investors, 
and then began their own practices here—evolving into firms  of  accountants. 
English firms,  such as Price Waterhouse & Co., sent agents of  the firm  to the 
United States to conduct examinations on behalf  of  English investors. By 1900, 
Price Waterhouse's activities were significant  enough here that Arthur Lowes 
Dickenson came to manage them. A young English auditor on his staff  at the 
time, George O. May, succeeded Dickenson as senior partner in America in 
1911, remained in the post until 1940, and had an incredible influence  upon the 
manner of  practice and the development of  standards in America. An American 
of  the day, Colonel Robert Montgomery, was also an early leader in establishing 
the American practice. He was a CPA, a lawyer, a military figure,  a Columbia 
University professor,  and president of  the associations which eventually 
became the AICPA. In 1905, he edited the first  American textbook on auditing 
(called, simply Auditing)  which was, naturally, an adaptation of  the leading 
English text of  the day. 
In 1896, New York was the first  state to pass a law designating the 
professional  title of  Certified  Public Accountant. Other states quickly followed. 
Likewise, uniform  tests for  CPAs were developed early in this century. 
Through this period, however, the American practice, in terms of  procedures 
and process, was little more than an extension of  the Scots and English 
methodologies. Indeed, most of  the leading U.S. firms  were led by Scots and 
Englishmen until the early 1960's. For at least the first  quarter of  the century, 
the bulk of  audit "staffmen"  were imported from  the United Kingdom. Thus, 
as in England, the focus  in America was initially upon auditing as a report to 
management rather than as a review of  management's report to investors and 
lenders of  its own stewardship. Much of  the development of  the auditor's legal 
liabilities over the past 53 years has focused  on this change in the audit's 
emphasis to a review of  the managment's financial  report to third-party users 
of  financial  information. 
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C.  Early  Development  of  Standards  in America 
Pressure for  a change in emphasis in the purpose of  financial  reporting and 
auditing began early in this century. Before  the great stock market crash of 
1929, ownership of  stocks and bonds became more than a game for  the 
wealthy. Many small, individual purchasers—relatively unsophisticated and in 
large measure financing  their purchases with borrowed money—entered the 
stock market. Investors wanted more and more accurate financial  information, 
and critics wanted more standardization of  accounting and reporting practices. 
The new investing audience was more interested "in the income statement and 
less in the balance sheet."8 Despite this need for  more standardization, 
practices varied substantially on subjects such as depreciation and reporting of 
income statements. Critics of  the profession  complained of  the lack of 
standardization, the inadequacy of  financial  information,  and the manipulative 
practices which abounded.9 
Three developments between 1916 and 1934 went far  in the United States 
to formulate  standards and define  the duties and liabilities of  auditors. In 1916 
the Secretary of  Commerce (William Redfield),  the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) requested the American Institute 
of  Accountants (AIA) to prepare a memorandum on balance sheet audits. Since 
many of  the audits conducted had been balance sheet audits done without actual 
observation of  inventories and assets, they were concerned about the integrity 
of  financial  information  of  the day. 
The AIA committee, which included George May and Robert Montgomery, 
adopted a Price Waterhouse internal memorandum entitled Memorandum  on 
Balance Sheet  Audits.  This memorandum was approved and accepted by the 
FTC and the FRB and published initially in 1917 in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. It was revised and republished several times before  1930. The AIA 
itself  revised the memorandum and published it in 1936 as Examination of 
Financial  Statements  by Independent  Public Accountants.  While this effort 
resulted in some standardization and definition  of  the auditor's role, it still did 
not require observation or testing of  inventories or the confirmation  of 
receivables. It would be left  to a major scandal for  that to occur. 
The second major occurrence in the development of  standards began from 
a 1927 AIA initiative, when it approached, but was turned down by the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), to jointly develop financial  reporting require-
ments for  NYSE registrants. After  the 1929 crash, the NYSE reversed itself 
and asked for  the AIA's help in developing accounting principles. George May 
was called into service yet again to chair two separate committees to cooperate 
with exchanges and develop accounting principles. 
May's committees did not support the adoption of  a set of  specific 
directives of  accounting treatment, but suggested in 1932 "very broad limits 
[of  accounting treatments within which reporting companies would make] 
disclosure of  the methods employed and consistency in their application from 
year to year. " 1 0 In 1933 the NYSE required all new registrants to have audited 
annual financial  reports, but made no requirements for  disclosure of  accounting 
methods. May's committees published a pamphlet in 1934 called "Audits of 
Corporate Accounts" and recommended a new form  of  audit report which used 
the words: "fairly  present, in accordance with accepted principles of  account-
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ing consistently maintained." In 1940 the reference  to "accepted principles of 
accounting" became "generally accepted accounting principles." From 1934 
on, the profession  recommended that companies choose accounting methods 
"within very broad limits" and identify  them in the financial  statements. Thus 
the concept of  GAAP was born—with the built-in flexibilities  upon which many 
of  today's critics harp. 
The third major occurrence in the period was the enactment of  the 
Securities Act of  193311 and the Securities Exchange Act of  1934.12 Before 
these enactments, no laws in the U.S. required audited financial  statements for 
"public companies." When initially passed, the Securities Act was enforced  by 
the FTC, which quickly published regulations for  the determination of  inde-
pendence of  auditors and uniform  accounting rules. The Securities Act requires 
registration of  new securities via a registration "statement" including financial 
statements certified  by an independent accountant. The 1933 Act imposes 
significant  legal liabilities upon experts identified  in the registration statements 
for  false  statements in the portions of  the report as to which they are experts. 
It also prohibits fraud  in connection with the sale of  new securities. 
The 1934 Act is an overlay beyond the 1933 Act which created the SEC to 
enforce  both Acts. It prohibits false  statements in connection with the sale of 
securities, and was particularly significant  in its impact upon public auditors in 
the context of  private securities fraud  suits. The 1933 and 1934 Acts and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder clearly established concrete standards, 
roles, and liabilities for  American auditors. 
D. The  Agony of  Defeat 
The late 1930's marked the beginning of  litigation in the United States 
which had direct impact upon the duties and liabilities of  auditors. This paper 
cannot relate all  cases which have historical significance,  but several have had 
"landmark" results upon the profession. 
1. Testing Inventories and Assets 
The McKesson  & Robbins case is the most significant  "early" auditing case 
in America. Philip Musica, alias Frank Donald Coster, was a con man. His first 
scrape with American justice in 1909 resulted in conviction and a prison 
sentence for  bribing customs officials  and preparing fraudulent  invoices and 
customs documents. Within three years of  leaving prison, he was caught for 
bilking twenty-two banks on loans obtained with collateral he did not own. He 
spent three years in prison and was placed on probation. 
In 1920, Musica claimed to be in the drug business but was actually a 
prohibition bootlegger. In 1923, he became the sole owner of  Girard & 
Company, a manufacturer  of  drugs. Despite being sole owner, he hired Price 
Waterhouse to conduct audits. He studied auditing procedures and noted that 
auditors did not observe physical inventories unless requested to do so. In 
1926, with financial  support from  bankers, he purchased McKesson & Robbins 
which was merged with his company. 
In December 1938, Musica was confronted  by his treasurer and director 
who had uncovered fraud,  waste, mismanagement and inclusion of  fictitious 
inventories and assets exceeding $10 million. A receiver was appointed by a 
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federal  judge, and that same day the ever present George May of  Price 
Waterhouse met with the company's executives and assured them that, as far 
as he knew, the books were in order. Eleven days later Musica committed 
suicide. Investigation revealed that on stated assets of  over $87 million, $10 
million in inventory and $9 million of  receivables were fictitious. 
Price Waterhouse settled the trustee's claim by refunding  $522,402.29 
representing five  years' audit fees.  The SEC commenced an investigation 
which exposed the lack of  agreement among auditors as to what the appropriate 
audit procedures were with regard to inventories and receivables. In the wake 
of  the scandal, but before  the SEC could issue its final  report, the AIA 
established a committee in January 1939, to examine audit procedures. In 
October 1939, the AIA issued its Committee on Auditing Procedures' 
Statement  on Auditing  Procedure  No.  1: Extensions of  Auditing  Procedure, 
which required observation and testing of  physical inventory and confirmation 
of  receivables. 
The SEC's report, which was issued in 194013 contained the following: 
• Price Waterhouse was found  to be derelict in failing  to follow 
procedures which a diligent auditor would have used in the circum-
stances, and which were called for  in the authoritative works on 
auditing (e.g.,  Montgomery, Auditing  Theory  and  Practice  (1934), p. 
157 and 182). 
• While auditors claimed not to be insurers of  financial  health, "discov-
ery of  gross overstatement in the accounts is a major purpose of  an 
audit " 
• Management's activities are within the scope of  an audit, so auditors 
should be elected by shareholders. 
• The profession  did well to publish SAP No. 1, but it should also 
distinguish between auditing "standards" and "procedures." 
• Regulation S-X was amended so that the auditor's report states 
whether the audit was made in accordance with appropriate GAAS. 
The profession  responded by having the AIA Committee on Auditing 
Procedure prepare a statement defining  audit standards. In 1947, the AIA 
published a brochure incorporating the Committee's memorandum "Tentative 
Statement of  Auditing Standards—Their Generally Accepted Significance  and 
Scope." We now know this as Statement  on Auditing  Standards  No.  1. The 
statement distinguished between standards (which deal with "quality of 
performance  and objectives to be attained") and procedures (which "relate to 
acts to be performed").  While over the years the interpretations have been 
amended from  time to time, the three original auditing standards ("General 
Standards," "Standards of  Field Work" and "Standards of  Reporting") 
remain the same. 
The McKesson  & Robbins case is a graphic illustration of  how scandal and 
litigation can result directly in long-term advances in the definition  of  a 
profession's  role, standards, and legal liabilities. Since this case resulted 
directly in SAP NO. 1 and SAS No. 1, it is difficult  to find  a more seminal 
example. 
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2. Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass "Go" 
Perhaps the most image-shattering cases for  the profession  have been 
those which resulted in criminal convictions for  independent auditors. Recently, 
in connection with a federal  investigation and indictments relating to a major 
financial  scandal, a picture of  a Big Eight partner being led to his arraignment in 
handcuffs  appeared on page 1 of  the New  York  Times  Business Section. More 
recently, a managing partner of  a Florida practice office  of  a major accounting 
firm  pleaded guilty to several counts of  fraud  and criminal securities conduct, 
including taking a payment from  ESM Securities and giving a clean opinion in 
the face  of  fictitious  collateral securing millions of  dollars of  ESM's securities 
transactions. In the same case, the company's lawyer (the son-in-law of  ESM's 
major benefactor)  committed suicide. The lurid headlines created by these 
criminal financial  scandals have a far-reaching  impact upon the public's 
perception of  and respect (or lack thereof)  for  the profession. 
Three such criminal cases have had far-reaching  impact upon the profes-
sion's self-image  and its view of  the attendant duties and liabilities. In 1968, a 
senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate of  Lybrand, Ross Bros. 
& Montgomery were convicted (after  a jury trial) of  mail fraud  and securities 
fraud  for  certifying  the 1962 financial  statements of  Continental Vending 
Corporation. The main defense  was that the financial  statements were in 
compliance with GAAP. The trial court held, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for  the Second Circuit affirmed 14 that compliance with GAAP was not a 
complete defense  against a charge of  criminally certifying  a false  and misleading 
financial  statement, and that auditors must report major management miscon-
duct. 
The Second Circuit took its task of  passing on criminal liability of 
professionals  quite seriously: 
While every criminal conviction is important to the defendant,  there is a 
special poignancy and a corresponding responsibility on reviewing 
judges when, as here, the defendants  have been men of  blameless lives 
and respected members of  a learned profession.  . . . 
In a widely quoted passage, the court enunciated an accountant's legal 
responsibility to investigate management dishonesty: 
[I]t simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose 
what he knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent, 
a corporation is being operated not to carry out its business in the 
interest of  all the stockholders but for  the private benefit  of  its 
president. For a court to say that all this is immaterial as a matter of  law 
if  only such loans are thought to be collectible would be to say that 
independent accountants have no responsibility to reveal known dishon-
esty by a high corporate officer.  If  certification  does not at least imply 
that the corporation has not been looted by insiders so far  as the 
accountants know, or, if  it has been, that the diversion has been made 
good beyond peradventure (or adequately reserved against) and effec-
tive steps taken to prevent a recurrence, it would mean nothing, and 
the reliance placed on it by the public would be a snare and a 
dilution. . . . 
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The defendants  were fined  and placed on probation. In 1972, President 
Nixon pardoned them. 
In 1974, a partner and an audit supervisor were convicted after  a jury trial 
for  criminal violations of  the securities law by making false  statements in a 1969 
proxy statement for  National Student Marketing (NSM). On appeal, the 
conviction of  the partner was affirmed,  while the supervisor's was reversed.15 
The partner was sentenced to imprisonment for  one year and fined  $10,000. 
The jail sentence was suspended to 60 days. 
The charges centered upon NSM's policy of  recognizing revenue which 
was selected by the partner and based upon the percentage-of-completion 
method. NSM was recognizing revenue when it allegedly received "commit-
ments" on fixed-fee  contracts to participate in marketing programs developed 
by NSM which were aimed at the "youth market." NSM's utilization of  the 
method, and its decisions as to when it had "commitments" (i.e.  recognizing 
revenue on "unbilled accounts receivable") resulted in overstating "net 
sales" by approximately $1 million and reporting "net earnings" of  $702,270 in 
its 1968 Annual Report when there were in fact  no earnings at all. NSM 
experienced an incredible stock price rise (from  $6 to $80 in less than two 
years) and used the stock to make a series of  acquisitions. 
After  selecting the percentage-of-completion  method for  NSM's 1968 
financial  statements, the partner instructed the supervisor to check on the 
commitments. The supervisor did so, but in a haphazard manner by telephone. 
No written verifications  were sought or received. The partner permitted NSM 
to include $1.7 million of  such commitments as unbilled receivables for  1968 
and this in turn permitted NSM to show a profit  instead of  a loss. The footnotes 
to the annual report's financial  statements did not disclose the "flimsy"  nature 
of  the commitments. 
Within five  months of  the publication of  the 1968 financial  statements, NSM 
had to write off"  $1 million of  the $1.7 million of  commitments. When the 
auditors learned of  the circumstances of  the write-off  and the periods they 
related to, they netted the reduced earnings against a favorable  extraordinary 
tax item instead of  reducing earnings and sales for  the prior period. Thus, the 
auditors helped to conceal the actual write-off  of  profits.  NSM then published 
the Proxy Statement for  the nine months following  1968 without disclosing the 
problems with the earlier period. 
The Second Circuit noted that the partner's action in allowing bookings on 
commitments for  1968 "was contrary to sound accounting practice,"16 and 
after  discovering the bogus nature of  them "[h]onesty should have impelled 
[him] to disclose" the problems in the updated footnotes  in the Proxy 
Statement. The Second Circuit then enunciated what is now called the 
"suspicious inquiry doctrine." 
Shortly after  the Natelli  conviction, three independent auditors were 
convicted in the aftermath  of  the Equity Funding Corporation of  America 
securities scandal. The three were the partner in charge and two audit 
managers of  Wolfson,  Weiner, Ratloff  & Lapin which had been merged into 
Seidman and Seidman in 1972. After  a jury trial, the three were convicted of 
multiple counts of  securities fraud  and filing  false  SEC documents. The 
conviction was upheld on appeal.17 The Equity Funding scandal, which involved 
widespread use of  computers to perpetrate a massive fraud  and the spectacle 
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of  issuing new insurance policies to dead people to make Equity Funding's 
growth track look continuous, was perhaps the most publicized securities 
scandal of  the 1960's and 1970's. Books have been written about the case. 
Careers of  attorneys were made while careers of  investment advisors and 
accountants were destroyed. 
These cases, and cases like them, should stand as a beacon for  the 
profession  signifying  a line beyond which one cannot go for  one's client. 
Moreover, they clearly demonstrate that auditors are not exempt from  criminal 
liability. 
3. Expanding Liability to Clients—The "Adverse Interest" 
Analysis 
Even as criticism of  the accounting profession  by governmental represen-
tatives, investors, customers of  failed  banks and financial  services institutions, 
and the courts grows, the profession's  own clients are expanding the auditor's 
responsibilities and liabilities. The financial  statements of  a company are, legally 
and under the accounting literature, management's reports of  the company's 
financial  transactions. It often  comes as a rude awakening then, when, after  the 
client's officers  and directors have set accounting policy, prepared the financial 
statements, and represented them to be true and accurate to the auditor, the 
corporate client  disclaims responsibility for  the active fraud  of  its own officers 
and directors, and sues the auditor for  negligence in failing  to discover and/or 
disclose that fraud.  There was a time when clients were unable to make these 
suits stick, but those days are gone. 
The early cases concerning the allocation of  blame for  financial  dishonesty 
between the client and the auditor often  arose where employees made 
defalcations  of  the client's assets. The issue was generally addressed from  the 
perspective of  whether the client should bear responsibility for  failure  to 
properly supervise its employee, or whether the auditor should bear the loss 
for  negligence in not detecting the employee's dishonesty. Under ancient 
common law theories of  "agency" or respondeat  superior the principal/ 
employer is responsible for  the negligent or wrongful  acts committed in the 
course of  the agent/employee's employment. When the employee actually 
steals from  his employer, the courts have ruled the illegal deed to be outside 
the "scope of  employment" (i.e.,  it is "adverse" to the "interests" of  the 
employer), and held the agency/respondeat  superior doctrines inapplicable to 
place the blame on the employer. Rather, in these cases the courts generally 
adopted the old contributory negligence standard. Under this approach, even if 
the auditor were negligent in detecting the fraud,  there would be no liability for 
the loss where the client was "contributorially negligent" and thus could have 
avoided the loss by the exercise of  reasonable care in supervising its own 
employee.18 Even in these cases, auditors were sometimes found  in "breach of 
contract" and had to return their fees  to the client. 
This standard, which was the most favorable  for  auditors, began to be 
reduced when courts overlaid a requirement that the auditor would not avoid 
liability unless the client's contributing negligence somehow contributed to the 
auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud. 19 In such cases, the courts 
acknowledged a belief  that part of  the function  of  the audit was "detecting 
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defalcations  which the [company's] negligence ha[d] made possible. . . ." 
Thus, there was no automatic defense  for  the auditor just because the client's 
negligence in supervising the errant employee permitted the loss to occur, but 
there was a defense  when the client's negligence permitted the auditor's 
negligence or somehow undercut the auditor's  ability to perform  its job. 
The tightening of  the noose around auditors began in a series of  cases 
which adopted a variant of  the "adverse interest" analysis. First, in Shapiro  v. 
Glekel, 20 the court utilizing the modified  negligence test described above 
refused  to dismiss a case against the auditors of  Beck Industries. Beck had 
become a conglomerate by acquiring numerous companies in the 1960's. The 
president and chairman of  Beck's executive board had fraudulently  prepared 
financial  statements which overstated assets and revenues. These inflated 
statements helped keep Beck's stock price high, and the stock and fraudulent 
statements were used in the acquisitions. Beck went bankrupt. The trustee for 
the estate sued the auditors on behalf  of  Beck arguing that the "outside" 
directors would never have authorized the aggressive acquisition program had 
they known Beck's true financial  condition. 
The court found  that however negligent or unlawful  the conduct of  Beck's 
officers  had been, it had not prevented the auditors from  performing  their 
audit. In analyzing the case it is difficult  to see how the actions of  the president 
and his cohorts were not on behalf  of  Beck and in the scope of  employment. 
They did not steal from  Beck per se, rather they launched a scheme which 
aggrandized the company and allowed it to acquire new assets (although surely 
their own stock holdings and positions were benefited  as well). If  the auditors 
were able to utilize the respondeat  superior argument, they would certainly have 
been able to avoid or significantly  cushion liability. 
To date the courts have refused  to permit auditors to use such arguments. 
A prime example is In  re Investors  Funding  Corp., 21 where the company's 
officers'  attempted bribes led directly to the company's failure.  In suing the 
auditors after  the company failed,  the trustee claimed that the officers'  fraud 
and mismanagement would not have continued "but for"  the auditor's actions. 
The auditor staked its defense  on the claim that it was a victim of  the officers' 
fraud,  and not responsible  for  it. The court referred  to the principles of 
respondeat  superior and observed that the adverse interest test (which lets the 
employer off  the hook when the employee's acts are "adverse" to the 
employer") does not apply when the employee is acting at least partly for  the 
employer's benefit  "even though the agent's primary interest is inimical to that 
of  the principal." 
Nevertheless, the court refused  to dismiss the trustee's case and found 
that the officers'  scheme to keep the company afloat  was not even partly for  the 
benefit  of  the company. It accepted the trustee's allegations that the officers' 
false  financial  statements prolonged the company's "artificial  solvency," and 
this was "predominantly antagonistic" to the company's interests. The court 
held that this benefited  only the officers  and not the company. 
Auditors have had a bright moment in the interim, such as in a case where 
the court found  a company's officers  had turned the company into "an engine 
of  theft  against outsiders" and refused  to permit recovery on behalf  of  the 
company against its auditors.22 But for  the most part, the courts have refused 
to follow  such logic, and refuse  to saddle a client with the fraudulent  or even 
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criminal acts of  its own officers  and directors, and do permit recovery against 
auditors.23 
An interesting irony has developed with regard to the auditor's legal 
liabilities as opposed to those of  the officers  and directors of  America's larger 
public companies. The former  have come to be regarded as having a higher 
standard of  diligence and care—they are the "watchdogs"24—than the officers 
and directors of  their clients who have the underlying duty to honestly and 
faithfully  account to the public for  their stewardship. Auditors have not been 
permitted to avoid the acts of  their own employees who have been found  to 
have had fraudulent  intent (even where no partners have such intent) again, 
because the special duties of  auditors require them to be even more vigilant in 
monitoring their employees.25 
In essence, the courts have permitted corporations whose downfall  is 
attributable to their own leaders to disclaim responsibility because the leaders' 
acts were so wrongful  as to be "ultra  vires"—even  though the corporation may 
have been aggrandized, incurred increased assets, and grown in share price as 
a result of  those acts before  the acts were discovered. The very shareholders 
and creditors of  the corporations have then been permitted to collect millions of 
dollars in damages from  auditors and their insurers to pay for  the ensuing drop 
in share price, the debts, and the shortfalls  created by the wrongdoers. On the 
contrary, the courts have not permitted auditing firms  to escape liability where 
the acts of  partners or junior auditors are clearly and undeniably contrary to the 
audit firms'  overall interests and their own published policies and procedures.26 
Has the pendulum swung too far?  Should corporations, their shareholders and 
creditors (who frequently  have significant  corporate governance power through 
debt covenants and agreements) share in the responsibility for  ensuring that 
their corporate leaders prepare and release accurate financial  statements? 
III. Expansion of  the "Protected" Class 
The subject of  the expansion of  class of  those who will be permitted to bring 
suit against the auditor always begins with a discussion of  Ultramares  Corp.  v. 
Touche, 27 even though Ultramares  was not the first  case to restrict the class of 
those entitled to sue an auditor.28 In Ultramares,  Touche, Niven & Co. was 
retained to prepare and report on the balance sheet of  Fred Stern & Co. as of 
December 31, 1923, as they had done for  three prior years. Fred Stern 
financed  his company through extensive borrowings, and Touche knew how 
Stern financed  the company. Touche was aware that Stern would show its 
certified  balance sheet to creditors. Touche supplied Stern with 32 copies of 
the balance sheet, each as a counterpart original. There was, however, no 
specific  agreement with Touche as to who would see the balance sheets or how 
many times they might be used. There was no identification  of  Ultramares, no 
communication between Touche and Ultramares, and Ultramares had not been 
a Stern creditor in earlier years. The subject of  who would look at the balance 
sheet was left  indefinite. 
The audit was finished  and a net worth of  more than $1 million was indicated 
in the balance sheet. Touche issued a clean opinion. The books had been 
falsified,  and Stern was actually insolvent. Ultramares saw the balance sheet 
and extended substantial credit to Stern before  discovery of  the insolvency. It 
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sued Touche claiming the audit was negligent or fraudulent.  There was no 
indication of  fraudulent  intent ("scienter") and the trial judge dismissed the 
fraud  claim, but the jury found  Touche negligent. The judge granted Touche a 
dismissal judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Division re-
versed the judge's holding and held Touche negligent. 
On appeal, New York's highest court reversed and found  for  Touche. In an 
eloquent opinion the famous  Judge Cardozo rejected "the assault on the citadel 
of  privity." "Privity" is the close relationship which exists between parties to 
a contract. Cardozo was concerned to prevent the expansion of  liability for 
"negligent words" from  growing to duplicate an action in fraud  in the absence 
of  the "indispensable element" of  scienter. In this sense he was four  decades 
ahead of  the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst  & Ernst  v. 
Hochfelder. 29 
Dispensing with the issue of  fraud  since there was none, Cardozo turned to 
negligence. He held that auditors cannot be liable for  negligence to third parties 
where the auditor could only foresee  the third-party plaintiff  in a general way. 
This was the case where plaintiff's  loans to the audit client were within a "wide 
range of  transactions in which a certificate  of  audit might be expected to play a 
part." Cardozo refused  to unnecessarily enlarge the class of  third parties 
which might sue auditors: 
If  liability for  negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure 
to detect a theft  or forgery  beneath the cover of  deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for  an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of  a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether 
a flaw  may not exist in the implication of  a duty that exposes to these 
consequences. 
Judge Cardozo made it clear that he had no intention of  "emancipating" 
auditors from  liability. He simply would not extend it to an "indefinite''  group of 
third parties in the absence of  more than mere negligence. Much of  what has 
happened in the auditor's legal liability during the last fifty  years can be viewed 
as ebbs and flows  in the application of  the privity doctrine. 
A. Privity  and Unaudited  Financial  Statements 
Conflicting  opinions as to the range of  accountants' liability have led courts 
to issue confusing  decisions where unaudited statements are involved. In a 
number of  cases, auditors have been found  liable to their client  for  non-audit 
work,30 and to the public in actions by the SEC or criminal authorities.31 In 
Natelli,  supra, the court adopted what has come to be referred  to as the 
"suspicious inquiry" standard in connection with accountants involved in 
preparing unaudited financial  statements. The auditor has a duty to investigate 
figures  known by him to be suspicious, and to insist upon corrections in 
published reports, even though no audit is conducted. 
In cases involving nonaudited statements, the courts frequently  frame  the 
critical issue as the question of  extending accountants' liability to third parties 
who are not in privity. One line of  case law continues to accept the Ultramares 
approach, while other courts take issue with Ultramares  and generally rely on 
the Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  (Restatement) standard in assessing the 
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extent of  the accountants' liability. Section 552 of  the Restatement rejects 
Ultramares  to the extent that privity is the sole definitional  criterion of  duty. 
The Restatement standard for  negligent misrepresentation seems to be 
"knowing reliance" rather than "reasonable foreseeability,"  the latter being 
the hallmark of  the negligence determination in other areas of  tort law. Courts 
using this analysis to find  liability focus  on whether the accountant knew the 
third party would rely upon the financial  statement. 
In Bonhiver v. Graff, 32 the Minnesota Supreme Court found  an accountant 
liable to a third party, a receiver of  an insurance company, for  failing  to discover 
an embezzlement during a write-up engagement that was never completed. 
The court based its decision on the fact  that the accountant had audited the firm 
in a prior year and was aware of  its poor financial  condition. When the 
accountant personally showed his workpapers and figures  to state examiners 
who relied on such data, such knowledge on the defendants'  part "rendered 
them liable for  their negligence" in the preparation of  those workpapers. For 
authority, the court analogized to the Natelli  case. For additional authority 
Restatement § 552 was applied. 
A classic example of  the Restatement reasoning is in Ryan v. Kanne. 33 
There, the Iowa Supreme Court dealt a blow to the concept of  privity, 
increasing considerably the accountant's potential liability to third parties. 
Kanne owned and operated certain businesses, including lumber companies, 
which had incurred considerable indebtedness. He sought the services of  an 
accountant at the insistence of  the officers  of  a creditor. The accountants were 
to determine the true amount of  the accounts payable. The accountant 
submitted financal  statements clearly marked "unaudited," but an accompany-
ing letter described certain confirmation  procedures which the accountants had 
undertaken to verify  the accuracy of  their figures.  When Kanne Lumber and 
Supply, Inc. was incorporated and took over the assets and liabilities of  Kanne's 
lumber business, it discovered that the accounts payable were incorrect. 
The Ryan court looked to Rusch Factors,  Inc.  v. Levin,34 as establishing the 
guiding principle to be followed  for  determining auditor responsibility in this 
context. In Rusch Factors,  which involved a certified  financial  statement, the 
federal  district court expressed considerable doubt about the wisdom of 
Ultramares: 
Why should an innocent party be forced  to carry the weighty burden of 
an accountants' professional  malpractice? Isn't the risk of  loss more 
easily distributed and fairly  spread by impositing [sic] it on the 
accounting profession,  which can pass the cost of  insuring against the 
risk on to its customers, who can in turn pass the costs on to the entire 
consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of  foreseeability  elevate the 
cautionary techniques of  the accounting profession? 
The Ryan court concluded that "the test to be adopted is whether the third 
party to whom the accountant owes a duty of  care is actually foreseen  and a 
member of  a limited class of  persons contemplated." Recovery for  negligence 
is limited "to persons for  whose benefit  and guidance the accountant knows the 
information  is intended." The court approved the more liberal Restatement 
position but declined to say whether liability should extend to all foreseeable 
third parties. 
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Despite the fact  that the statements were clearly labeled "unaudited," the 
court was unwilling to accept the accounting profession's  concept of  unaudited 
services, a rejection which was probably attributable to the court's perception 
of  the public expectation of  accountant responsibility in both audit and nonaudit 
engagements. 
Recently in Seedkem,  Inc.  v. Safranek, 35 an Indiana corporate creditor 
brought a diversity action against a CPA who was a resident of  Nebraska. The 
plaintiff  claimed that financial  documents prepared for  the debtor were 
"recklessly and wantonly prepared" and the accountant knew that the 
unaudited, inaccurate statements failed  to conform  with generally accepted 
accounting principles. The court rejected the accountant's motion for  summary 
judgment on strict Ultramares  privity grounds because the case at hand was 
"qualitatively distinguishable," and because "in light of  the overwhelming and 
subsequent erosion of  the viability of  the Ultramares  decision, it is not so 
readily apparent that the state courts . . . of  Indiana and Nebraska would cling 
to the outmoded and restrictive doctrine of  privity as a precondition to a finding 
of  accountant's liability." 
The court quoted Ryan and noted that the state courts of  Indiana and 
Nebraska might choose to follow  § 552 of  the Restatement as both have 
followed  the Restatement's positions in other areas. 
A second case which relied on the Ryan rationale was Spherex,  Inc.  v. 
Alexander  Grant & CO.36 General Home Products (GHP) engaged Alexander 
Grant to prepare an unaudited  financial  statement for  a twelve-month period 
based on financial  information  provided by GHP. Copies of  this statement were 
submitted by GHP to Spherex to obtain credit. When Spherex subsequently 
sustained a financial  loss in its dealing with GHP and sued Alexander Grant, the 
latter contended that its liability did not extend to a third party creditor not in 
privity. 
The court began its analysis by noting that it had previously expressed 
disfavor  of  the privity doctrine in personal injury cases: "Our reluctance to 
apply the privity rule has extended to allowing a proper plaintiff  to recover for 
mere financial  loss resulting from  the negligent performance  of  services." 
Furthermore, the court noted a resemblance of  this case to cases involving 
contract law in that the duty owed by Alexander Grant to Spherex was "not 
entirely dissimilar to the duty we have held a promisor owes to an intended 
third-party beneficiary."  Next, the court analyzed the evolution of  the 
Ultramares  holding and its privity requirement. According to the New 
Hampshire court's observation, "judges have not hesitated to permit recovery 
where the plaintiff's  identity was specifically  known to the negligent defend-
ant." The reason for  this, the court stated, was that judges are seeking to link 
the privity doctrine with Cardozo's "social utility" rationale of  protecting 
professions  from  the specter of  unlimited liability to a virtually limitless class of 
plaintiffs.  The real question, said the court, is whether the defendant  has some 
special reason to anticipate the reliance of  the plaintiff. 
According to the Spherex  court, the second reason for  distinguishing the 
Ultramares  opinion is that it is "a relic of  a bygone economic era." Both the 
sophistication of  modern accounting procedures and the accountant's central 
role in the financing  and investment industry are a far  cry from  the fledgling 
profession  in need of  judicial protection that existed at the time of  Ultramares. 
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Under this court's theory, if  the choice is between the reliant third party and 
the CPA, the accountant should bear the burdens of  legal responsibility. The 
court buttressed this reasoning by drawing an analogy between an accountant 
and a manufacturer  under product liability law. Both are ' 'in the best position to 
regulate the effects  of  [their] conduct by controlling the degree of  care 
exercised during the performance  of  [their] professional  duties." The court 
concluded that the Restatement harmonizes the accountant's contemporary 
role and his potential liability, and "represents a reasoned approach to the issue 
of  professional  liability for  negligent misrepresentation.'' 
B. Potential  Widespread  Liability  to Third  Parties 
In Citizens  State  Bank v. Timm,  Schmidt  & Co.,37 the issue was phrased as 
a broad question: "May an accountant be held liable for  the negligent 
preparation of  an audit report to a third party not in privity who relies on the 
report?" The court answered in the affirmative,  based on the principles of 
Wisconsin negligence law. The defendant  accountants in this case regularly 
prepared financial  statements for  their client CFA. In November 1975, Citizens 
Bank made a loan to CFA after  reviewing the statements Timm had prepared. 
In early 1977, during the course of  preparing CFA's financial  statement for  the 
previous year, Timm's employees discovered that the 1974 and 1975 state-
ments contained a number of  material errors totalling over $400,000. Once 
informed  of  these errors, the bank called its loan, resulting in CFA going into 
receivership and dissolving. 
The court characterized the issue as one of  first  impression in the state of 
Wisconsin. For authority, the court turned to sources such as Rusch Factors, 
Ryan, and the Restatement § 552. The court also analogized to a Wisconsin 
state case involving an attorney who was held liable to a beneficiary  not in 
privity for  the attorney's negligence in supervising the execution of  a will. The 
court observed that the imposition of  liability would make attorneys and 
accountants more careful  in the execution of  their responsibilities: 
Unless liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of 
the financial  statements will not be protected. Unless an accountant can 
be held liable to a relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred. 
This "public policy" rationale was the main argument on which the court 
"hangs its hat." But there were "additional policy reasons to allow the 
imposition of  liability." The court feared  that if  relying third parties, such as 
creditors, were not allowed to recover, the cost of  credit to the general public 
would increase. Accountants, on the other hand, might spread the risk through 
the use of  liability insurance. The court concluded that accountants' liability to 
third parties should be determined under (and limited by) the accepted 
principles of  Wisconsin state negligence law: 
According to these principles, a finding  of  non-liability will be made only 
if  there is a strong public policy requiring such a finding.  . . . Liability 
will be imposed on these accountants for  the foreseeable  injuries 
resulting from  their negligent acts unless, under the facts  of  this 
particular case, as a matter of  policy to be decided by the court, 
recovery is denied on grounds of  public policy. 
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In Rosenblum, Inc.  v. Adler, 38 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined 
on appeal from  a motion for  partial summary judgment that public policy did not 
preclude the imposition of  liablity on accountants to third parties not in privity. 
The plaintiff-shareholders  acquired stock in Giant Store Corporation, allegedly 
relying on the correctness of  the audits done by defendants  Touche Ross. 
Unfortunately,  Giant had manipulated its books by falsely  recording assets it did 
not own and omitting substantial amounts of  accounts payable so the financial 
information  that Touche had certified  in the 1971 and 1972 statements was 
incorrect. 
While the New Jersey court obviously strained to be methodical and 
comprehensive, the reasoning of  the opinion is tenuous at many points. The 
court engaged in a two-step process to determine the accountant's liability in 
this situation. "First, we shall consider whether, in the absence of  privity, an 
action for  negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for  economic loss 
against the provider of  a service.'' The case law in New Jersey is split on this 
issue, according to the court. However, the court did note that the requirement 
of  privity was long ago discarded in product liability cases based on negligence. 
After  a review of  the decisions demonstrating that negligent representations 
referring  to products may be the basis of  liability irrespective of  privity, the 
court answered the question it had posed: 
Why should a claim of  negligent misrepresentation be barred in the 
absence of  privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's 
claim also sounds in tort, but is based on liability for  defects  in products 
arising out of  a negligent misrepresentation? If  recovery for  defective 
products may include economic loss, why should such loss not be 
compensable if  caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of 
the product and the person making a written representation with intent 
that it be relied upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the 
product is reasonably fit,  suitable and safe  and that the representation is 
reasonably sufficient,  suitable and accurate. The fundamental  issue is 
whether there should be any duty to respond in damages for  economic 
loss owed to a foreseeable  user neither in privity with the declarant nor 
intended by the declarant to be the user of  the statement or opinion. 
The second question which the court framed  was: "what duty [should] the 
auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of  the role of  the 
auditor in today's economy?" Whether a duty exists, asserted the court, is 
ultimately a question of  fairness.  The judicial analysis that must be made 
"involves a weighing of  the relationship of  the parties, the nature of  the risk, 
and the public interest in the proposed solution." 
The court appraised the fairness  of  imposing a duty by first  reviewing the 
auditing function  of  an accountant, concentrating on how it has changed and 
developed over the years. For example: "It is now well recognized that the 
audited statements are made for  the use of  third parties who have no 
contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge 
that companies use audits for  many proper business purposes. . . . " And: 
"The auditor's function  has expanded from  that of  a watch-dog for  manage-
ment to an independent evaluator of  the adequacy and fairness  of  financial 
statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors, and others." 
The court added that despite expanded liability, accountants have been able to 
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obtain insurance to cover these risks, leading them to believe that auditors 
should be able to "purchase malpractice insurance policies that cover their 
negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who receive the 
audit from  the company pursuant to a proper business purpose." 
When the court tacked on to the previous discussion the ideas that the 
imposition of  a duty to foreseeable  users will "cause accounting firms  to 
engage in more thorough reviews" and the extent of  financial  exposure already 
has certain "built-in limits" to protect auditors from  too much liability, the fate 
of  the defendant  was sealed. The policy arguments made in Rusch Factors  Inc., 
that the accountant can more easily carry the burden of  liability were repeated 
here, but the New Jersey court did add its own philosophy: "it is just and 
rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the imposition of  negligence 
liability, regardless of  the context in which it arises." The court believed that 
the investor and the general public will benefit  in the long run when the liability 
of  the CPA for  negligent misrepresentation is measured by the foreseeability 
standard. 
In applying the above analysis to the facts  at hand, the court looked first  to 
see whether the entity for  whom the audit was being made (Giant) used it for  a 
"proper business purpose." Acccording to the opinion, the defendants  should 
reasonably expect that their client would distribute the financial  statements 
pursuant to matters relating to its business, particularly given that there was no 
limitation in the accountants' opinion. The second requirement for  finding 
liability is justifiable  reliance. "Having inserted the audit in that economic 
stream" the defendants  should be responsible for  "their careless misrepre-
sentations to parties who justifiably  relied upon their expert opinions." 
Rosenblum is a frightening  spectre for  the profession.  At the same time as 
auditors are unable to secure reasonable insurance coverage, courts assume 
the fact  of  that coverage and extend liability even further. 39 
C.  The  Ultramares  Court  Speaks Again 
The New York Court of  Appeals had an opportunity to revisit the privity 
issue a little less than a year ago in Credit  Alliance Corporation  v. Arthur 
Andersen  & Co.,40 which considered two different  appeals by two different 
accounting firms.  In the Andersen  case, plaintiff  Credit Alliance and others 
were major financial  services companies which financed  the purchase of  capital 
equipment through installment sales or leasing agreements. They provided 
financing  to L.B. Smith (Smith), a "capital intensive enterprise that regularly 
required financing."  Plaintiff  began to insist in 1978 that Smith provide audited 
financial  statements as a pre-condition to further  loans. Smith provided its 
consolidated financial  statements for  the years 1976 and 1977 examined and 
reported upon by Andersen. In reliance on the statements, plaintiff  provided 
substantial loans to Smith. Plaintiff  continued to receive, rely, and lend on 
Smith's financial  statements in 1979. Smith petitioned for  bankruptcy in 1980 
while in default  to plaintiff  on several million dollars of  debt. 
Plaintiff  sued Andersen alleging negligence and fraud,  claiming Andersen 
knew or should have known that Smith was showing the statements to it for  the 
purpose of  obtaining loans. Andersen's motion to dismiss the negligence claim 
on privity grounds was denied in the lower court. The Appellate Division 
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affirmed,  finding  plaintiff  fit  into a narrow New York exception to the privity rule 
because the plaintiff  was a member of  the "limited class" entitled to rely on 
Andersen's report. The Court of  Appeals reversed the decision in favor  of 
Andersen. 
In the second case, European American Bank (EAB) sued the firm  of 
Strauhs & Kaye (S&K) because it made large loans to Majestic Electro 
(Majestic) beginning in 1979, allegedly in reliance upon interim and year-end 
financial  statements reported upon by S&K. S&K allegedly overstated Ma-
jestic's inventory and accounts receivable and did not disclose Majestic's poor 
internal controls. Majestic went into bankruptcy in 1983 after  defaulting  on the 
loans to EAB. EAB sued S&K, alleging negligence in auditing and that S&K 
was familiar  with the EAB-Majestic lending relationship and lending agree-
ments, including the fact  that EAB was receiving and relying upon the S&K 
audited financial  statements. Indeed, there were allegations that S&K and EAB 
representatives had been in direct oral and written communication during the 
entire course of  the lending relationship. On S&K's motion in the lower court, 
the complaint was dismissed for  lack of  privity. The Appellate Division reversed 
citing the direct communication between S&K and EAB—using a Restatement 
§ 552 approach—and observing that S&K specifically  knew EAB was relying on 
the financial  statements. The Court of  Appeals affirmed  in S&K's case. 
The Court of  Appeals reviewed the Ultramares  case and its rationale and 
reaffirmed  it as expounded upon. The court observed that some relationships 
are "so close as to approach privity" and that would be a sufficient  predicate 
for  finding  liability, thus the result in the EAB portion of  the case. The Court of 
Appeals focused  on the fact  that in Ultramares  the accountants only knew 
"generally" that third parties would see the report, and nothing had been said 
between auditor and client about who would see the reports "or the extent or 
number of  transactions in which they would be used." The court distinguished 
this situation from  one where the facts  bespeak "an affirmative  assumption of  a 
duty of  care to a specific  party, for  a specific  purpose, regardless of  whether 
there was a contractual relationship." It found  the Andersen case to fit  the 
Ultramares  type of  fact  pattern, while the S&K case fit  the latter situation. 
The Court of  Appeals set forth  a test for  guidance in determining whether 
auditors should be held liable to those not in privity: 
Before  accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual 
parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial  reports, 
certain prerequisites must be satisfied:  (1) the accountants must have 
been aware that the financial  reports were to be used for  a particular 
purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance  of  which a known party or 
parties was intended to rely; and (3) some conduct on the part of  the 
accountants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the 
accountants' understanding of  that party or parties' reliance. 
The court observed that different  states had adopted different  standards in 
addressing the privity issue. Some like New Jersey and Wisconsin had thrown 
it out and extended liability to any third party who could be foreseen  to rely on 
the financial  statements. Others, like Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Colorado 
and Kansas follow  a strict Ultramares  privity test. Still others use the 
Restatement approach. The New York Court of  Appeals explanation of  what 
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Ultramares  means and how liability may extend to third parties in appropriate 
factual  circumstances is certainly a reasonable, well-thought-out and refreshing 
consideration of  the issue. It is also another end of  the historical thread linking 
the development of  today's standards to the earlier precedents. 
IV. Where We Are Headed 
This paper has considered the historical development of  several facets  of 
auditor's responsibilities, standards and liabilities; the interplay between 
litigation, legislation and professional  standards; the broadening of  the auditor's 
responsibilities to its client even in the face  of  management's criminal 
activities; the overlay of  potential criminal liability to those who close their eyes 
to suspicious developments and attempt blindly to follow  GAAP; and, the 
incredible expansion of  third parties who have been held entitled to rely on 
financial  statements and to sue the auditor. It remains to consider what the 
future  may hold. It would be impossible to consider all ramifications  outside the 
context of  a textbook or a novel. 
In the ESM litigation referred  to supra, Alexander Grant is being sued for 
millions of  dollars in damages by numerous customers of  ESM including various 
municipalities from  around the country. The allegations of  the suits incorporate 
the expected common law negligence and fraud  claims, and securities law 
violations. They go further  and allege violations of  the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),41 that Alexander Grant participated 
with others through a "pattern of  racketeering activity" to use ESM as an 
enterprise to commit criminal acts. If  successful  in proving a RICO case, 
damages to which the plaintiffs  would be entitled would be trebled and could 
theoretically approach $1 billion. While the allegations of  ESM present a rather 
wide departure from  appropriate auditing and accounting standards, the 
spectre of  RICO liability for  auditors in connection with "garden variety 
securities fraud"  cases looms ahead. 
RICO was originally drafted  to stem the inroads by organized crime into 
legitimate businesses. It provides a civil suit remedy and has become a favorite 
of  the plaintiffs'  bar. Last summer accountants were hoping for  relief  when the 
Supreme Court decided Sedima  S.P.R.L.  v. Imrex  Co.42 Unfortunately,  the 
Court refused  to read RICO narrowly and ruled that its civil provisions could be 
applied to virtually all commercial disputes. Justice White acknowledged the 
problem, but observed that the cure "must lie with Congress." Congress, 
however, has shown no serious intention to amend RICO. Certainly, on the 
heels of  the ESM scandal and the media attention given to the E.F. Hutton 
overdrafting  system, the public has not indicated that it favors  a narrowing of 
RICO's targets to accept "legitimate businessmen" such as auditors. 
Even the foreign  judicial systems and lending agencies have caught the 
fever.  In an Australian case, Cambridge  Credit  Corp.  v. Hutcheson,  the auditors 
were found  liable for  a negligent audit and the plaintiff  was awarded approxi-
mately $100 million (an amount exceeding the audit firm's  assets as well as 
those of  its individual partners). In recent lawsuits in New York a foreign 
government, England, and at least ninety other plaintiffs  have sued Arthur 
Andersen in several federal  actions as a result of  the collapse of  John 
DeLorean's automobile venture. The suits allege securities violations as well 
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as RICO causes of  action, and request $270 million in damages to be trebled to 
nearly $800 million. The British government invested $120 million to finance 
DeLorean's Belfast,  Ireland factory. 
Andersen issued a clean opinion for  DeLorean Motor Company. The 
plaintiffs  allege that some of  their money was diverted through a Swiss bank 
account of  GPD Services, Inc. (a Panamanian company) to DeLorean's 
personal account. They claim as well that Andersen had ample knowledge of 
questionable transactions between GPD and DeLorean's company. The plain-
tiffs  suggest that Andersen workpapers indicate an awareness of  problems 
which should have brought the Natelli  "suspicious inquiry doctrine" into 
play.43 
Dramatic, albeit not quite as dramatic, mega-suits have evolved against 
auditors as a result of  the Penn Square National Bank and Drysdale Govern-
ment Securities scandals. The number of  such lawsuits is not likely to decline in 
the near future,  thus making it more difficult  for  auditors to obtain insurance. 
At the same time as these suits appear, our legislators in Washington 
continue to examine the conflict-of-interest  standards and other alleged 
deficiencies  of  the profession.  Representative John Dingell (D. Mich.) is 
chairman of  a House oversight subcommittee before  which witnesses have 
criticized the peer review system, the SEC's laxity in overseeing the 
profession,  and the fact  that audit client's management hire, fire,  and pay the 
auditor. The latter criticism allegedly makes auditors reluctant to report 
objectively on their client's financial  statements and/or to blow the whistle 
where appropriate. In addition, certain accounting treatments which are 
justifiable  under GAAP have been questioned. Dingell and some of  his 
witnesses are unhappy with the flexibility  afforded  under GAAP for  various 
methods of  depreciation, costing of  inventory, as well as for  alleged inconsis-
tency of  disclosure for  various accounting treatments. The subcommittee has 
been troubled by the issuance of  clean opinions just prior to financial  debacles 
which have made front  page news. 
The Dingell subcommittee required the Big Eight accounting firms  to 
submit detailed disclosure reports relating to litigation losses as well as to 
internal matters. As of  yet, Dingell shows no lack of  continued interest in 
pursuing the oversight hearings. Not even Washington insiders are sure where 
the subcommittee will end up. The ultimate questions, of  course, are: Will 
there be some form  of  more direct government regulation of  the practice? Will 
auditors be permitted to continue to practice in the scope of  practice which is 
currently enjoyed? Will more dramatic corporate governance mechanisms 
become the rule? 
Whatever the results of  the trends, the pattern is a continuum of  what has 
been happening in the profession  for  more than 80 years. The financial 
community's demand for  accurate financial  information  has grown, not abated. 
Auditors created a business for  themselves over the past 130 years of  fulfilling 
the marketplace's financial  information  needs. Indeed, the CPA's license is a 
franchise  to attest with respect to the market's financial  statements. That 
marketplace, as well as the regulators responsible for  oversight, had been 
allocating greater and greater responsibility—with attendant legal liability—to 
the profession.  In many cases the expansion was based upon a now obsolete 
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premise that the auditor could, in turn, assess that liability broadly through fee 
structure and insurance coverage. 
As the profession  faces  this challenge, several actions seem imperative. 
The profession  must reflect  upon standards which are unclear, ambiguous, or 
insufficient.  The wide  flexibility  favored  by George May is simply so out of  favor 
in several critical areas that it needs to at least be reexamined. The profession 
must be even more vigilant in applying the suspicious inquiry doctrine. Several 
more major financial  scandals where clean reports have been issued will only 
spur on the regulators and the plaintiffs'  bar. The profession  and its represen-
tatives must be media-conscious and take initiative to get its message to the 
public. It should perhaps explain the billions of  dollars of  financial  transactions 
which are successfully  audited year-in-and-year-out. It should lobby and 
communicate about the problems associated with RICO and the current use of 
the adverse interest analysis. But, the profession  is far  from  fatally  diseased. If 
history repeats itself,  it will make the appropriate accommodations and move 
forward. 
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